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It is very tempting, and many have succumbed, to order Foucault’s work into three 
periods, three sets of  preoccupations, and concomitantly three “methods” – archaeology, 
genealogy and technologies of  the self, although Dreyfus and Rabinow suggest four! 
There is some sense to this periodisation; it is not “outside the true”. Foucault’s work has 
both a developmental trajectory in the sense of  building, moving and changing overtime, 
but with distinctive points of  transition, although, at the same time, he abandoned some 
lines of  thought and announced dead ends reached. There certainly is a sense in which 
everything he wrote is a set of  preludes to something else that remains to be written, and 
that is always out of  grasp. Foucault once asserted, «My work takes place between 
abutments and anticipatory strings and dots» . 1
Even if  we accept a periodization of  early, middle and late Foucault it would be a 
mistake to see the different phases of  his work as demarcated by distinct ruptures. 
Indeed, as Nealon  puts it «rather than seeing his post-1969 shifts of  emphasis as a series 2
of  failures and dialectical sublimations. We will argue that the shifts in Foucauldian 
emphasis are more productively understood as a series of  “intensifications”». Foucault 
certainly did not appear to see these intensifications in the focus of  his work as breaks, 
and his own claims about the integrating principles of  his work rest on the topics and 
questions that preoccupied him rather than the ideas he brought to bear, although Prado  3
cautions that «Foucault’s efforts to present his work as more homogenous, coherent, and 
focused than it was should be judiciously assessed». There are a variety of  such claims. In 
1983 Foucault described his work of  the previous 20 years as having been «to create a 
history of  the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made 
subjects» . In a series of  lectures at Berkeley also in 1983 he said: «What I tried to do 4
from the beginning was to analyse the process of  “problematisation” – which means: 
how and why certain things, behaviour, phenomena, processes become a problem» . He 5
also spoke of  his work as being concerned with the history of  practices and the history 
of  veridictions or a history of  institutions. Each of  these descriptions has a useful 
validity. 
 M. Foucault, Questions of  Method, trans. C. Gordon in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds), The Foucault 1
Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Harvester/Wheatsheaf, Brighton 1991, p. 90.
 J.T. Nealon, Foucault Beyond Foucault, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2008, p. 5.2
 C. G. Prado, Starting with Foucault: An introduction to genealogy, CO Westview, Boulder 1995, p. 56.3
 M. Foucault, Afterword: The subject and power, trans. L. Sawyer in H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond 4
structuralism and hermeneutics, University of  Chicago  Press, Chicago 1982-1983, p. 208.
 M. Foucault, Fearless Speech, Semiotext, New York 2001, p. 171.5
Serpieri, Grimaldi, Ball Introduction
The three periods, if  they exist at all, can be understood as marked by different points 
of  emphasis across the three vectors of  Foucault analytical framework – truth, power 
and subjectivity. All three vectors are evident in all three periods but in each case one is 
prominent, but always in a relation to the others. Foucault himself  signals these changing 
emphases in his analyses in various ways, and describes himself  as «studying each of  
these three areas in turn» , and as moving from a focus on forms of  knowledge, to the matrix 6
of  forms of  behavior, to the constitution of  the subject’s modes of  being. The focus of  this 
collection of  papers is primarily on the third of  these, that is, the final or late Foucault as 
it often referred to .  7
However, overall in educational studies, up until recently, there has been tendency to 
draw primarily on Foucault’s middle period and its focus on the problem of  power, and 
in particular on Discipline and Punish . There is an obvious basis for this inasmuch as 8
Discipline and Punish has an explicit relevance to and several direct references to the school 
as an institution. As he writes: «Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, 
barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?» . However, most of  the uses of  this 9
middle Foucault tend to rest on an interpretation and representation of  him as a 
philosopher of  oppressions. Devices such as the means of  correct training, the 
panopticon, normalisation etc. are deployed to explore, or more often re-describe, the 
processes of  schooling, or the experience of  teaching and learning, in terms of  
surveillance, classification and exclusion. In this vein, some refer to Foucault’s «bleak» 
and one-sided vision of  modernity  or his analysis as revealing «the grim truth of  the 10
education process – namely, that it is a core element in the mechanics of  modern 
disciplinarity» . Those are proper readings of  and uses of  Foucault, and ones that he 11
acknowledged, but they are also partial. More generally, Baker and Heyning  have 12
identified three main uses of  Foucault works in educational studies, articulated around 
three different intellectual projects and endeavours:   
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•Historicization and philosophizing projects, where archaeology, genealogy and history of  
the present have been used to offer insights into the conditions of  possibility for 
certain discourses, questions, educational problems . 13
•Denaturalization projects, where a more sociological Foucault and concepts like 
power-knowledge, discipline, surveillance, governmentality are deployed to focus on 
classroom-based and pedagogical-moment approaches or beyond-school settings as 
education sites . 14
•Critical reconstruction projects that share features of  the first two lines of  inquiry but 
develop the ambition to delineating a new vision or practice . 15
The secondary literature tends to see Foucault’s late period work as an attempt to 
redress or unpick the supposedly totalizing theoretical cage constructed by his work on 
discipline and government by attending instead to freedom, resistance and self-
authorship. As McNay sees it, in the later work: «Through the formation of  a critical 
ontology of  the self  it is possible to formulate an alternative ethical standpoint from 
which individuals can begin to resist the normalising force of  the “government of  
individualization”» . The essence of  the orientation to freedom in the late Foucault is a 16
curiosity towards the arts of  being governed and «all of  those practices and discourses 
that seek to homogenise subjectivity, to make it uniform, and narrow the spoke of  
freedom»  – of  which schooling would be a case in point. This is a permanent 17
orientation of  scepticism or perhaps cynicism as «a mode of  relating to contemporary 
reality» . Such an orientation or attitude requires not just a «gesture of  rejection» rather a 18
«move beyond the outside-inside alternative; we have to be at the frontiers». Foucault 
calls this a «critical ontology of  ourselves» that «may be characterized as a limit-attitude» ; 19
i.e., a process of  analysis and reflection upon the frontiers or limits of  «what is given to 
us as universal, necessary, obligatory»; a process which considers those singular, 
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contingent and arbitrary «events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize 
ourselves as subjects of  what we are doing, thinking, saying» . Our present, says 20
Foucault, exemplifying his point with reference to Baudelaire’s work, is «confronted with 
the practice of  liberty that simultaneously respects this reality and violates it» . It is these 21
possibilities of  freedom that are more directly and clearly explored in the later Foucault, 
more precisely from around 1980 when he began to articulate a politics of  the care of  the 
self . This special issue addresses some of  the ways this later work enables us to think 22
education differently, and the possibility of  certain “lines of  fragility”, in particular in 
relation to the concept of  self  formation. That is, education as the production of  a subject 
«capable of  turning back upon itself: of  critically studying the processes of  its own 
constitution, but also subverting them and effecting changes in them» . Self  formation in 23
this sense is a starting point for experiments with an education or educations that do not 
simply reconstitute what has failed in the past. The emphasis here is on «both the open-
endedness of  the present as a project and freedom as a process of  struggle»  and the 24
possibility of  exploring how an alternative ethos to the prevailing neoliberal episteme 
could be developed though the government of  self  and of  the others. As Pignatelli  25
puts it, this means «taking up the challenge of  creatively and courageously authoring 
one’s ethical self». This involves dispensing with our modernist conceptions of  ethics 
and freedom. Here freedom is the capacity and opportunity to participate in one’s self-
formation, and ethics is the practice of  this capacity in relation to oneself  and others. 
Freedom is constantly produced and ethics is an on going set of  practices. This is an 
aestheticism – an imaginative creativity. It is the cultivation of  a self  that is both a 
product and a disruption of  various discourses that requires one to practice the art of  
living well, by creating a space within which it is possible to make oneself  thinkable in a 
different way – that is «to become other than how you find yourself» . 26
In several respects the two last lecture series that Foucault gave at the Collège de France 
- The Government of  Self  and Other (1983) and The Courage of  Truth (1984) both return to 
and rework the primary vectors of  his analytical framework – that is to say, he begins an 
analysis of  relations between modes of  veridiction (truth) (parrhesia in particular), 
techniques of  governmentality (power), and forms of  practice of  self  (subjectivity), each 
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as mutually constitutive without reducing each of  them to the others. This as Peters and 
Besley discuss provides the outlines for the problematisation of  government in a general 
sense, that is of  democracy. 
Foucault certainly did not outline a general theory of  freedom, or of  political relations 
rather he identified a set of  “problems” and outlined some methods of  analysis and 
developed a set of  tools, a toolbox of  concepts, which he hoped others would use and 
develop further. He expressed frustration that so much effort was devoted to writing 
about what he might mean rather than doing the sort of  practical analytical and critical 
work that he advocated so vigorously. In this collection the emphasis is on using rather 
than reading Foucault. It presents a set of  tracks and signposts that are starting points for 
thinking differently about a post-neoliberal education. It is an exercise in curiosity – a 
word and an attitude that intrigued Foucault, and as he explained: 
I like the word; it suggests something quite different to me. It evokes “care”; it evokes the 
care one takes of  what exists and what might exist; a sharpened sense of  reality, but one that is 
never immobilized before it; a readiness to find what surrounds us strange and odd; a certain 
determination to throw off  familiar ways of  thought and to look at the same things in a different 
way; a passion for seizing what is happening now and what is disappearing; a lack of  respect for 
the traditional hierarchies of  what is important and fundamental . 27
Using Foucault for thinking differently about education 
The emphasis of  this collection of  papers is on using Foucault for thinking differently 
about education. A distinctive feature of  the contributions is to mobilise a foucauldian 
attitude towards the historicisation and denaturalisation of  what it means to be educated, 
and the privileging of  a critical ontology of  the self  as part of  wider projects for the 
critical reconstruction of  both education as a practice of  government and our modes of  
being as educational subjects. In relation to that, it is possible to identify four distinctive 
issues around which the papers of  this collection coalesce: a) the formulation of  a 
distinctive foucauldian ethical standpoint for a post neoliberal education; b) the 
mobilisation of  the foucauldian concept of  self  formation to outline a different ethics of  
education; c) the sketching of  a politics of  the care of  the self as a tool to remake the school 
as heterotopy; d) the use of  the foucauldian analysis of  parrhesia to rethink professional 
practice in education as a practice of  self. 
The first issue focuses on the foucauldian problematisation of  government, the 
modern state, democracy and civil society, and relatedly, concerns the formulation of  a 
distinctive ethical standpoint from which to rethink the contemporary individualising arts 
of  government and, implicitly, their relation to education. In his article, Mark Olssen 
rejects recent readings of  Foucault’s later writings as supporting neoliberalism and 
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“supply-side” models of  the state, arguing instead that Foucault can be seen to advocate 
a form of  republican social democracy of  a distinctly communitarian sort. According to 
Olssen, the translation of  Foucault’s anti-statism, anti-Hegelianism and anti-Marxism into 
a defence or support for neoliberalism fails to link the treatment of  neoliberalism as a 
positive form of  state biopower to a positive state or anti-naturalistic thesis and thus 
does not capture the key arguments of  Foucault’s critique of  neoliberalism. In contrast, 
he recalls how Foucault’s lectures on The Birth of  Biopolitics clearly offer a reading of  
neoliberalism as a set of  indirect, non-centralised mechanisms or governmental 
techniques with potentially repressive effects, where the problem of  the improvement of  
human capital through education encounters the potential re-emergence of  eugenics and 
opens up the learner to diverse forms of  behavioural manipulation. Olssen suggests that 
Foucault’s distinctive thesis on neoliberalism is that the state actively constitutes 
neoliberal rationality to the detriment of  civil society as a way of  reconciling economic 
efficiency with the needs of  population and security. Thus, neoliberalism as the active 
policy of  the state, might generate either forms of  totalitarian rule or lead to complete 
chaos as a result of  a lack of  governmental regulation. Rooting his critically 
reconstructive argument in a detailed reading of  Foucault’s final lecture of  The Birth of  
Biopolitics series, on Adam Ferguson, Olssen asks if  Foucault’s open question to 
neoliberalism in the twentieth century could be interpreted as a critique of  a doctrine 
which applies economic models of  competitive behaviour to every sphere of  society. 
Moving from that, the hypothesis is put forward the hypothesis that Foucault’s interest in 
the Scottish Enlightenment is at least in part normative, given the reintroduction of  the 
figure of  homo politicus in a way that allows a sort of  resolution of  the conundrums of  
liberalism and neoliberalism, laissez-faire, homo oeconomicus and positive state power. 
According to the author, for Foucault Ferguson offers an occasion to work on a notion 
of  civil society that will bed down economy and governmentality in a single regulatory 
pact, mobilising the figure of  homo politicus as a counter-balance to Smith’s homo 
oeconomicus. In relation to that, the article suggests that Foucault’s re-theorisation and de-
transcendentalisation of  the state can be understood as functional to an attempt to 
outline a distinctive ethico-political standpoint where a republican and communitarian 
conception of  civil society can serve as the basis for the invention of  a new form of  
governmentality. From such a perspective, Olssen argues, the relation between the 
economic and the political is maintained according to a governmental rather that state-
centric theory, in which civil society constitutes a governmental technology, which is an 
integral and always present counter-balance to the dissociative norms of  economy.  
In their contribution, Peters and Besley address the present crisis of  liberal democracy 
and liberal internationalism. They use the post-truth orientation of  US President Donald 
Trump as an exemplary case to problematise government and democracy through a 
foucauldian lens. They explore the complex relation between modes of  veridiction and 
practices of  truth-telling, techniques of  governmentality and forms of  practice of  self. 
In particular, they mobilise Foucault’s 1980s lectures on the relationship between 
subjectivity, power and truth to make sense of  what they call the post-truth era and 
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outline an ethical standpoint in defence of  the concept and practice of  democracy. The 
authors analyse the crisis of  liberal democracy moving from the exploration of  the 
political and ethical implications of  “free speech” and an emphasis on the foucauldian 
sensibility, towards the ethical self-constitution of  the subject and self-mastery, or more 
generally towards how the human subject enters into scientific or politico-institutional 
games of  truth. Peters and Besley go on to offer a detailed account of  Foucault’s 
discussion of  parrhesia and focus specifically on parrhesia as educational practice. That is, 
they point to the epistemic, political and therapeutic role of  the parrhesiastes as teacher-
philosophers and the centrality of  parrhesia in an art of  living - the establishing of  a 
relationship to oneself  with the aim of  self-mastery. The authors end their account by 
emphasising two sides of  the Pre-socratic problematisation of  truth: that is the problem 
of  determining the true-value of  a statement and the emphasis on the societal and 
individual importance of  telling the truth. They point out that Foucault’s ultimate 
concern in this respect was «to construct a genealogy of  the critical attitude» in Western 
culture and to signal the potential of  a reworking of  parrhesia as a political concept that 
problematises truth telling as an aspect of  the government of  self  and others in 
democracy. This highlights how Foucault’s lectures in the early to mid 1980s, as a 
continuation of  his analysis of  liberal and neoliberal governmentality, stand as a return to 
the moral foundations of  democracy and re-examine its relations of  power and 
problematisation. Re-connecting their analysis to the initial discussion of  the present 
crisis of  liberalism, liberal internationalism and the threats of  the present post-truth 
authoritarianism, Peters and Besley use Foucault’s analysis to disentangle a political 
double paradox that lies at the heart of  democracy: if  democracy becomes an 
impossibility without true discourse (and vice versa), at the same time true discourse has 
as its conditions and effects the introduction of  difference into a democractic egalitarian 
structure, via conflict, confrontation and rivalry. That is something which is completely 
different from and irreducible to democracy itself. This provides a basis on which to 
reframe the problem of  freedom of  speech in liberal digital societies and enables an 
ethico-political defence of  the concept and practice of  democracy that privileges 
education a primary vector cutting a line through truth, governmentality and the self. 
The next two papers of  this collection relate directly to the possibilities offered by the 
late Foucault to think education differently, in particular in relation to the concept of  self  
formation. The way Foucault deals with the issue of  freedom, in fact, is marked by a 
gradual shifting of  interest from the interlocked combination of  power-resistance toward 
the government of  ourselves as a countermove to being governed by others. In other 
words, an emphasis on subjectivation as an autonomous struggle of  dis-identification and 
dis-individualisation. Moreau in his contribution on Foucault and the educational 
metamorphosis, takes inspiration by Deleuze:  
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The struggle for a modern subjectivity passes through a resistance to the two present forms 
of  subjection, the one consisting of  living ourselves on the basis of  constraints of  power, the 
other of  attracting each individual to a known and recognized identity, fixed once and for all.  28
Thus, education as a place for the “violent” determination of  identity is a main focus 
of  Moreau’s and Allen’s contributions. Both write as critics of  education rather than as 
critical educators. Allen puts at the centre of  his reflections Cynic thought as discussed 
by Foucault particularly in Fearless speech and in The Courage of  Truth, while also touching 
on the work of  Sloterdijk (De Conciliis engages with Sloterdijk more directly in her 
contribution); while Moreau focuses mainly on Stoicism as depicted by Foucault in The 
Herméneutics of  the Subject. Allen presents the Cynic attitude as an extreme expression of  
scepticism that «challenges a set of  ideas and attachments central to education», from 
«the role of  the teacher as guide» to the Benign Violence that results from the cynical 
aggression that transforms the educational relation in an engagement, a battle, switching 
between peaks of  great aggressivity and moments of  peaceful calm: here the difference 
with the Socrates’s dialogue is flagrant. The Cynic represents, in fact, a style of  life that 
challenges the taken for granted and the conventions, practicing the transgression up to 
the derision both of  the philosophy itself  and of  education with its aspirations of  
democratization. Diogenes the Cynic, furthermore, embodies the experimentation of  
other forms of  existence, continuously inciting to the improvisation of  the way of  life, 
and looking for a subversive ad-hocery, in order to challenge our basic assumptions of  
what life and education should be: «humanity [is] understood here as a fabrication, as 
something that can be reworked». In this direction Allen highlights how the Cynic 
attitude provokes a crisis of  the principles of  the liberal, elitist, and masculine education, 
as well as of  the «popular schooling that was based in part on the notion that teachers 
would act like secular priests, serving as moral exemplars to be emulated by the offspring 
of  the poor»; recalling the failures of  neo-liberal education, a theme that will be 
discussed also by De Conciliis in her contribution. 
Moreau, considers Stoic thought and particularly the foucauldian reading of  Seneca, 
and stresses the violence of  the radical conversion required and undertaken by educational 
institutions, pretending to determine the true identity of  the knowing subject. Over and 
against this immediacy is set the slowness, the patience, the daily mundane experience of  
the individual undertaking the path of  the formation of  the self: in other words, the 
truth is not that of  knowledge but rather «the truth of  the subject is his own capacity to 
transform himself». The educational paradigm of  conversion, that finds its peak of  
expression in Durkheim «for whom education is a conversion of  the conscience to the 
truth of  the Tout social», hierarchically produces unequal results: the access to the truth of  
knowledge is abstractly, and formally granted and the subject is required to renounce the 
value of  mundane experience. Again over and against this, the Stoic metamorphosis is 
linked to a «political educational project», centred on the care of  the self  and its 
techniques, and enacting spiritual exercise (meditation, ascesis, and a conscious 
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examination of  their peculiarity and their difference from those of  early Christianity. 
Here a space is opened up for the movement from subjectivation as procured by 
educational institutions and the autonomous subjectivation of  the self, cultivating the 
metamorphosis of  ourselves in an other pedagogical space: our world and our present. 
The third issue relates to the possibility of  mobilising Foucault and a politics of  the care 
of  the self to rethink the scholastic form through an ethos alternative to the (neo)liberal. 
That is, an experience of  education as experiments of  freedom within heterotopic 
spaces. While Allen and Moreau offer critiques of  education that end up leaving the 
individual “alone” in the search for another educational space, both Simons and 
Masschelein, and Cappa offer possibilities for re-thinking pedagogy and the school form 
itself. The first two authors invite to complement Foucault’s influential genealogy of  the 
school as a site of  disciplinary power that gives rise to an analytical pedagogy with a 
morphology of  the school as a site of  gestures that enact a pedagogy of  the present. 
They attempt to think “pedagogically” with Foucault. In particular, to avoid an exclusive 
focalisation on the ethical and the political, they work with and beyond Foucault to 
reflect on the relationship between scholastic pedagogy, the limits of  government and 
their transgression. In doing so, Simons and Masschelein hybridise Foucault’s genealogy 
and ethical government of  the self  with Rancière’s morphological approach and propose 
«an attempt to re-claim the “scholastic”», distinguishing a scholastic pedagogy of  the present 
from the «analytical pedagogy of  learning», grounded in a «cognitive approach that 
considers learning as a process of  knowledge construction and skill or competency 
development». Here, scholastic – recalling the meaning derived «from the Greek 
skholastikos (studious) and skholazein (to be at leisure in study)» – is defined as form of  
school learning that could articulate a pedagogy of  the present. To clarify the traits of  
such an inviting (and not prescribing) pedagogy of  the present, the authors introduce the 
notions of  de-subjectivation, experience, exercise, curiosity and essay. These ingredients, they 
argue, could figure out an educational space where an undefined (and not pre-defined) 
self-transformation becomes possible. As they state: 
The outcome of  this pedagogy is not to increase knowledge and not to consolidate one’s 
subjectivity, but to arrive at a condition where the moment that one’s subjectivity dissolves is at 
once where it becomes possible to establish new relationships to one’s actuality.  
Continuing their journey beyond those critical education studies that reprise the 
genealogical Foucault, they argue, there are other «studies that attempt to show how 
contemporary (neo-liberal) forms of  governing education leave an ethical space for 
teachers or pupils to shape the self  in a different way». Specifically, they suggest how a 
morphological understanding of  the school form invites to think of  pedagogy as a 
foucauldian heterotopia and heterocronia, an «other place and time outside the 
necessities of  labour and family life», which is heterogeneous to the neoliberal productive 
order. In this vein, they hypothesise the possibility of  a pedagogic liberalism, and a school-
form and scholastic pedagogies that leave new generations with an equal time and space 
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to undertake an undefined (rather than predefined) work of  freedom and to find their 
own proper form. 
Relatedly, Cappa proposes to re-think a pedagogic place that could go beyond the 
«dispositifs of  knowledge and power», «a space of  subjectivation [of] stubborn exteriority 
that characterizes […] the specific characteristics of  the “pedagogical”, thereby 
differentiating itself  from» the pedagogical. This could be considered as «a space and 
time, perhaps distinct even from heterotopias, in which modes of  existence that elude 
closed systems of  power and knowledge are formed and transformed; in which practices 
such as truth-telling and parrhesia, and the processes of  subjectivation of  which they are 
part, impact on bodies and take care of  subjects». In this way, the pedagogical would us 
permit to enact the educational experience as a form of  pleasure, as a subjectivation that 
evades the extant dispositifs of  knowledge-power. Its value is properly deictic, that of  an 
indication, of  what is «specifically and particularly true of  the “real” in education». 
In their proposal for a diverse pedagogical space both of  these contributions highlight 
how the educational apparatuses of  neo-liberal society are challenged by the outside of  
education: Simons and Masschelein wonder if  the pedagogy of  the present «resides and 
only can flourish outside the walls of  schools?»; while Cappa recalls the obsolescence of  
the educational agencies in relation to «new virtual spaces» within which knowledges are 
constituted and identities are transformed «by a highly-diversified flow of  experience, 
and by power relations that are increasingly immaterial and insubstantial».  
Serpieri, in his article, highlights how educational heterotopies are already evident, and 
some of  these are produced in the processes of  exogenous and endogenous privatisation 
that are reconfiguring educational systems. These processes, in some instances, result in a 
profound fragmentation and segmentation of  institutions, of  curricula and of  
subjectifications. Moreover, increasing the places and the times of  the trans-formation of  
the self  are to be found outside of  formal education, in the form of  a «public 
pedagogy» , made possible by digital platforms and the relentless extension of  the Social 29
Networking Sites. The author emphasises how ethical government produces via digital 
social life the sort of  shift from disciplinary to control societies that was anticipated by 
Deleuze . The reciprocal government of  ourselves and the others also through the 30
platform society, in fact, could be seen as a further consequence of  the integration of  the 
techniques of  the self  in the educational, medical, and psychological discipline and 
moreover of  their transformation «thanks to the public opinion, the mass-media, the poll 
techniques [and we could add the social networks] - which play a moulding role for the 
attitude towards others and towards ourselves -, nowadays in order to impose self-
culture, that has lost its independence, to people through others» . It is not by 31
 B. Williamson, The Future of  the Curriculum: School Knowledge in the Digital Age, Mit Press, Cambridge 2013.29
 G. Deleuze, Postscript on Control Society, in «L’Autre Journal», 1990 n. 1, trans. M. Joughin, Negotiations 1972-1990. 30
Columbia University Press, New York 1995.
 M. Foucault, La culture de soi, in M. Foucault, Qu’est ce-que la critique? suivi de La culture de soi, Vrin, Paris 2015, pp. 31
81-109, pp. 97-98; transl. R. Serpieri.
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coincidence, Serpieri stresses, that neo-liberal education is reconfiguring the human capital 
of  the individuals not only in terms of  acquired knowledges but above all of  the 
formation of  the so-called soft skills - socio-emotional competences and character. In 
contrast the educational subjectifications formed in heterotopic spaces - what Serpieri 
call post-education - render individuals capable of  govern/controlling themselves in 
interaction with others, and gives value to «immaterial labour» , communicational and 32
relational competences, and the life (of  the mind) itself . In the light of  this, drawing on 33
some of  the aporias of  the final Foucault, Serpieri finally addresses the issue of  the 
possibility of  change of  the neoliberal educational policies. In other words, what are the 
conditions for the formation of  teachers’ and students’ collective subjectivities, and how 
might they practice resistance, refusal, and mount active opposition to the dispositif  of  
selection, competition, and evaluation. 
The last two contributions of  this collection address a fourth issue and closely related 
issue, the rethinking of  professional practice in education as a practice of  self. From such 
a perspective the core business of  education and educating becomes that of  
problematising the frontiers or limits of  «what is given to us as universal, necessary, 
obligatory», through the adoption of  what Foucault calls a limit-attitude or a critical 
ontology of  ourselves. 
In Il coraggio della verità. Per una critica parresiastica del sistema d’istruzione [The courage of  
Truth. For a parrhesiastic critique of  the education system], Eleonora de Conciliis explores how it 
is possible to use the late Foucault in pedagogical terms, and specifically the toolbox of  
concepts from his works on the care of  the self  and parrhesia, to come to a radical 
rethinking of  the concept of  pedagogy itself  and the role of  teacher as maestro-
exemplar. In three moves, the author shows a possible use of  the concept of  parrhesia 
within the practice of  teaching as a means to formulate a radical critique of  
contemporary education systems. These systems in de Conciliis view are entrapped 
within a form of  neoliberal algorithmic governmentality and increasingly colonised by 
the virtual-consumerist economy whose non-place is the web. First, de Conciliis 
reiterates Foucault’s argument that in the West the hermeneutic of  the self  has acted as 
the most capillary form of  the production and government of  subjected/educated 
subjects, through the obligations of  veridiction. Relatedly, she emphasises how the late 
Foucault might suggest to us that a re-examination of  greek/classical modalities of  
subjectivation and parrhesia, as a practices of  self-formation, could offer a promising 
path of  reflection to free ourselves from the hermeneutic of  the self. Importantly, in 
relation to the teaching profession, she argues that, through his own teaching practice as 
a parrhesiastic ‘magister of  suspect’, Foucault has taught us what cannot be taught: that 
we can bring to thought the functioning of  anthropotechniques or technologies of  the 
 M. Lazzarato, Immaterial Labor, in Work, Migration, Memes, Personal Geopolitics, in «ONCURATING.org», (2016) n. 32
30/June, pp. 68-88.
 P. Virno, A Grammar of  the Multitude. For an Analysis of  Contemporary Forms of  Life, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles 33
2004. 
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self, and we can understand that the subject, within them, as a bundle of  relations that 
can be deconstructed and re-fabricated differently. Second, de Conciliis argues that if  
education is the ‘production of  the human’, a form of  benign, smooth and rational 
violence, then a foucauldian critical method consists in the deciphering of  the myth of  
education, its sarcastic unmasking. In this way we can begin to understand its historicity 
with the objective of  making the subject’s becoming something different. For both 
teachers and students, the political challenge, according to the author, is to make the 
school into a political theatre through the practice of  parrhesia, where the aim is not so 
much to favour the “sapere aude” of  the individuals, but rather to help the students to 
reflect on the unthinking/unthought that inhabits the anthropotechniques that produce 
them (what she frames in terms of  politicising the de-politicised). The author ends her 
contribution with an attempt to outline an education inspired by the courage of  truth as 
a dangerous and paradoxical enterprise, where educating becomes a paradoxical 
production of  autonomy through heteronomy, whose aim is not only to teach to think in 
the Kantian-Enlightment terms but also to teach to not obey, to teach that obedience is 
not a virtue.  
In a similar vein, Emiliano Bevilacqua and Davide Borrelli in Il governo di sé e del sapere 
fra valutazione e parresia [The government of  the self  between evaluation and parrhesia] advocate a 
Foucault effect in education, and relatedly attempt to use, force and ultimately betray 
Foucault’s thought in order to draw from it the outline for a possible paidéia for our 
present. Their contribution shares with Peters and Besley a problematisation of  the 
current political situation as an aporetic era of  post-truth democracy, where the 
processes of  disintermediation of  communication opposes in a zero-sum game a post-
truth public discourse to an alethurgy of  power without freedom. In relation to that, the 
authors emphasize the possibility offered by the Foucauldian notion of  «political analysis 
of  truth» to denounce both the false consciousness which characterises the modern 
apologetic of  the relationship between education, emancipation and equality and the 
aporetic tension between public truth and subjective freedom at the heart of  the modern 
concept of  democracy. According to Bevilacqua and Borrelli, we live in a time where 
governmental power increasingly functions through the production of  freedom (and 
freedom of  speech) and this paves the way towards a post-truth society. Government 
increasingly occurs through alethurgical devices that affirm a principle of  order and 
objective truth at the expense of  the freedom of  the subjects and, in doing so, seriously 
prejudices any deliberative process aimed at producing socially shared truths (the authors 
discuss as an example the case of  evaluation and quality assurance). In relation to that, 
they argue that the political and pedagogical value of  foucauldian thinking lies in its 
capacity to offer a perspective within which it is possible to reconcile the critical 
deconstruction of  the productive functioning of  governmental power with an renewed 
practice of  education, with parrhesia as the care of  the self  and the ethopoietic exercise 
of  self-formation. Recalling Foucault’s reading of  the Enlightenment as an ontology of  
actuality in What is Enlightenment and his analyses of  parrhesia in the courses The 
Government of  Self  and the Others and The Courage of  Truth, Bevilacqua and Borrelli identify 
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the two poles around which a Foucauldian paideia may be articulated: a genealogical 
critique as an antidote to the scientific hierachisation of  knowledge and as strategy of  de-
subjection from power as truth; and an ethopoietic practice whose aim is the formation 
of  an autonomous subject, a practice of  the art of  living that becomes the field of  
struggle for the production of  different rules and rationalities. This is an education that 
abandons the model of  docility in favour of  that of  study (as a desire for self-formation) 
that, according to the authors, offers a viable way out of  the aporetic opposition at the 
heart of  contemporary democracy. That is, moving from the search for truth to the 
constitution of  the subject of  truth as an essential condition for reconstructing the 
viability of  the communication in contemporary democracy.  
Epilogue 
Undoubtedly, this collection of  articles is only a prelude to further work on the 
possible uses of  the final Foucault for thinking and practicing education differently. 
Despite differences in terms of  perspectives, emphasis and interpretative nuances, the 
contributions trace the intersecting axes of  an open space of  educational reflection, 
research and practice wherein to engage with, mobilise, force and perhaps go beyond 
Foucault (and specifically the final Foucault) in order to outline, explore and experience 
educational spaces and times alternative to those of  the (neo)liberal government of  
individualisation . The silent or specific interlocutor of  most of  the contributions and 34
the background against which they stand is the neoliberalisation of  education. That is, those 
diverse attempts to generalise the enterprise form in the field of  education , and its 35
multiple encounters with a politics of  numericisation and standardisation, where 
educational entities are made governable through their distribution within fixed physical 
spaces and dynamic analytical spaces, and quantification acts as criterion of  factuality and 
reality reflection .  36
As a reaction to these governmental processes in the field of  education, this collection 
of  papers outlines a space of  reflection, research and practice marked by a distinctive 
kind of  educational attitude - an ethos and form of  life which Foucault defines as a 
critical ontology of  ourselves . Engaging with education through such an attitude 37
involves a dangerous alchemy, combining those uses of  Foucault’s analytic machinery 
which are devoted to bring to Thought the conditions of  possibility for our educational 
 N. Rose, Powers of  Freedom: Reframing political thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999; S.J. Ball, 2017, 34
Foucault As Educator, op. cit.
 M.A. Peters, The new prudentialism in education: Actuarial rationality and the entrepreneurial self, in «Educational Theory», 35
vol. 55 (2005), n. 2, p. 123; M. Olssen, Toward a Global Thin Community, op. cit.
 A. Desrosieres, A. The economics of  convention and statistics: the paradox of  origins, in «Historical Social Research», 36 36
(2011), n. 4,  pp. 64-81.
 M. Foucault, What Is Enlightenment, op. cit.37
materiali foucaultiani, a. VII, n. 13-14, gen-dic 2018, pp. 9-27  21
Serpieri, Grimaldi, Ball Introduction
present through historicisation and denaturalisation, and projects of  critical 
reconstruction in which the critique and the historical analysis of  the limits imposed on 
us represents also «an experiment with the possibility of  going beyond them» , 38
contributing to develop a new practice of  education. Furthermore, perhaps one of  the 
most significant legacies of  the final Foucault is that thinking, researching and practicing 
education as a critical ontology of  ourselves involves giving impetus to the «undefined 
work of  freedom» , where a politics of  educational life as self-formation becomes the 39
locus of  educational production itself  and a means to detach ourselves from and 
«transgress the horizon of  silent objectification within which we are articulated» as 
education subjects . As such, the uses of  Foucault envisaged in this issue represent, first 40
and foremost, an invitation to cultivate the art of  not being educated like that and at that 
cost  and to challenge every educational option that is marked by an excess of  authority 41
or that presents itself  «in the form of  a simplistic and authoritarian alternative» . 42
The second axis that defines the contours of  this “other space” of  educational 
reflection, research and practice relates to a sober, careful and non-normative definition 
of  the key traits of  a foucauldian education. Building on that, and recalling recent works 
on Foucault as educator , it is possible to define a foucauldian education as an 43
emancipatory educational experience that can be judged against its relative capacity to 
recognise and promote difference and to contribute to the constitution of  autonomous 
subjects. Here autonomy is related to the growth of  capabilities disconnected from the 
intensification of  power relations that lead to discipline, normalisation and over-
regulation and as an extension of  the individuals’ participation to their present. Ball  has 44
recently attempted to sketch out what a foucauldian education might look like, arguing 
how Foucault’s “philosophical ethos” could be translated into two strands of  educational 
practices that dismantle the imaginary architecture of  contemporary schooling, its space-
time arrangements and its curricular, pedagogical and evaluative rationalist, linear and 
developmentalist foundations and, in contrast to that, reconceive the «classroom as a 
 Ibidem, op. cit., p. 45.38
 Ibidem, op. cit., p. 45.39
 S.J. Ball, A horizon of  freedom: Using Foucault to think differently about education and learning, in «Power and Education», 40
2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1757743819838289, 2.
 M. Foucault, What is critique?, trans. L. Hochroth, in The Politics of  Truth, Semiotext(e), New York 2007, p. 45.41
 M. Foucault, What Is Enlightenment, op. cit., p. 39.42
 See S.J. Ball, Foucault as Educator, op. cit.; J. Infinito, Ethical self-formation: a look at the later Foucault, in «Educational 43
Theory», 53 (2003), pp. 155-171; I. Leask, Beyond Subjection: Notes on the later Foucault and education, in «Educational 
Philosophy and Theory», 44 (2011) n. 1, pp. 57-73; J. D. Marshall, Michel Foucault: liberation, freedom, education, in 
«Educational Philosophy and Theory», 34 (2002), n. 4, pp. 413-418; T. Osborne, Foucault as educator, in M. Peters, T. 
Besley, M. Olssen, S. Maurer, and S. Weber (eds.). Governmentality studies in education, op. cit., pp. 123-136; M. Peters, 
Truth-telling as an educational practice of  the self: Foucault, parrhesia and the ethics of  subjectivity, in «Oxford Review of  
Education», 29 (2003), n. 2, pp. 207-224; M. Olssen, Liberalism, neoliberalism, social democracy, op. cit.; M. Tamboukou, 
Educational heterotopias and the self  Pedagogy, in «Culture & Society», 12 (2006), n. 3, pp. 399-414.
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space of  freedom, the curriculum as curiosity and pedagogy as a parrhesiatic 
encounter» :  45
• the fostering of  a learning environment that encourages experimentation, as the 
creation of  «opportunities for exploring new forms of  existence, of  being 
otherwise» . In such a learning environment, pedagogy would be understood as a 46
theatre of  subject creation and the classroom imagined as a heterotopic space/time 
arrangement, where all actions are intended to be responsive to learners’ active and 
engaged self-formation. In a sharp contrast to contemporary schooling, those other 
educational spaces would be sites of  experience where, starting from the 
problematisation of  the immediate and quotidian, «agonism is valued and failure 
would be a constructive opportunity to learn and to change – both of  which take time 
- the pace of  education would need to slow down» . Within those environments, the 47
core of  educating would be learning how to think about, to operate within, 
reformulate or perhaps even to reconstruct forms of  possible knowledge, the 
normative matrices of  comportment for individuals and the modes of  virtual 
existence that make us what we are. As Rabinow puts it, such work of  reformulation 
would entail «examining the previous forms that had been articulated as responses to 
a specific set of  historical problems, thereby making them available for a different use 
or set of  uses: as intellectual instrumentalities to illuminate contemporary problems 
and possible solutions» ; 48
• thus, a foucauldian education would rethink curriculum as a genealogical practice 
of  inquiry , that relates to knowledge as a problem rather than a content, and enables 49
the development of  an awareness of  one’s current condition as defined and 
constructed by the given culture and historical moment. Education as experimentation 
would constantly seek the de-naturalisation of  the concepts, practices, relations and 
social arrangements that organise and define our experience. Learning through inquiry 
would be an analysis of  «the intensifying venues of  experience» and the articulation 
within experience of  the forms of  possible knowledge, the normative matrices of  
comportment for individuals and the modes of  virtual existence for possible 
subjects . As Ball and Olmedo  have argued, the teacher/learner subjectivity would 50 51
become a site of  historicisation and political struggle, a site of  collective engagement 
 S.J. Ball, A horizon of  freedom, op. cit, p. 6.45
 Ibidem, p. 4.46
 Ibidem, p. 7.47
 P. Rabinow, Dewey and Foucault: What’s the problem?, in «Foucault Studies», 11 (2011), pp. 15-16.48
 J. Infinito, Ethical self-formation: a look at the later Foucault, in «Educational Theory», 53 (2003), pp. 155-171.49
 M. Foucault, Le Gouvernement de soi et des autres, op. cit., 5 January 1983, pp. 4-5.50
 S.J. Ball and A. Olmedo, Care of  the self, resistance and subjectivity under neoliberal governmentalities, in «Critical Studies in 51
Education», Vol. 54 (2013), n. 1, pp.  85-96.
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in the games of  truth marked by «a commitment to uncertainty»  and the will to 52
challenge collective forgetting. Such a genealogical disposition would be the anchor 
for a pedagogy of  curiosity, as a means of  loosening any relation to a fixed identity 
and challenge any educational politics of  the Same. It would be a pedagogy that 
encourages an attitude or disposition to critique and epistemological suspicion. It 
would not be articulated as bundles of  skills and knowledges but rather would locate 
at the heart of  its practice a form of  practical politics, a struggle to become self-
governing and would value the pluralisation and agonism of  voices and contestation 
over consensus and resolution. 
The remaking of  education as space of  experimentation and pedagogy of  de-
subjectivation, experience, exercise and curiosity would mean the rethinking of  the 
professional practice of  teaching, where teaching becomes an ethical practice whose 
main focus is to facilitate the impulse of  curiosity and self-fashioning, and to embrace 
the power of  difference. In such an education, the teacher becomes an interpreter of  an 
art of  living, rather than a subject entitled to teach a legitimate knowledge to others. 
Teaching would become an exemplary practice to learn from, rather than an act of  
legitimate knowledge transmission . In the effort to attend to and facilitate the learners’ 53
impulse of  curiosity and self-formation, teaching stands as a process of  asking questions 
without providing answers which always finds an unstable equilibrium on the edge of  the 
relationship between the care of  the self  and the care of  others . 54
As such, a foucauldian education would be a collective form of  action and 
intervention to develop ethical enthusiasm and agonism . It is not an individual affair 55
but presupposes a certain political and educational structure which makes freedom and 
self-formation possible. As Ball argues, «self  formation is not a lonely narcissism but is 
only possible within […] the fundamental encounter with the other» . It develops 56
through the production of  interferences between our reality and our past, opening up 
possible futures and enabling transformations of  the relation which we have with 
ourselves and the world .  57
 D. Youdell, School Trouble: Identity, Power and Politics in Education, Routledge, London 2011.52
 G.J.J. Biesta, Don’t be fooled by ignorant schoolmasters: On the role of  the teacher in emancipatory education, in «Policy Futures 53
in Education», 15 (2017), n. 1, pp. 52-73.
 S.J. Ball, A horizon of  freedom, op. cit, p. 14.54
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Relatedly, the third axis of  the space of  educational reflection, research and practice 
involves an enlargement of  perspective and the positioning of  a foucauldian education 
within a larger politics that redefines the relationship between society, economy and civil 
society and how this relates to political rationalities, to techne and to the constitution of  
the subject’s modes of  being in contemporary governmentality.  
Some articles in this issue not only highlight the «conditions of  possibility» of  
education as embedded into a (neo)liberal governmentality, but also offer some hints to 
think of  the conditions that could possibly subvert or at least change such a 
governmentality and its political reason. Both Olssen and Peters and Besley, argue from 
an ethico-political standpoint, in defence of  democracy and for a new form of  
governmentality that could be at least other than the neoliberal one, as indicated by 
Foucault . It is in this direction that the contributions offer diverse perspectives for 58
mobilising the final Foucault toward another governmentality, one in which an ethico-
political attitude toward experimentation makes the formation of  the self  its primary 
aim, together with the rediscovery of  a communitarianism. Olssen, in particular, 
advances a possible reading of  Foucault as a thin communitarian  distancing himself  59
from any reading of  Foucault as a “crypto-normative”, as argued by Habermas. In 
practice in order to portray a foucauldian education it is possible to think of  a change 
that looks at the deliberation and participation of  a homo politicus to counterbalance the 
instrumental rationality of  the homo oeconomicus. Concomitantly, homo socialis would be 
mobilised, within civil society, rather than in relation to the political rationality of  the 
state, giving rise to forms of  communitarian integration. In these terms it should be 
possible to track the places where the conditions of  possibility of  an experimental 
education are already evident. Such possibilities arise when breaches are opened, or 
unexpected agencies come to the fore over and against neoliberal policies of  formal 
education. It is these other educational spaces, in the web of  the platform society, 
bringing forth à la Ilich that public pedagogy , that Serpieri explores in his contribution. 60
Herein, of  course, we should remember with Olssen how the State-phobia on which 
the political reason of  neoliberalism is grounded was criticised by Foucault, and how he 
was also sceptical about the myth of  civil society. As Dean and Villadsen observe, 
Foucault not only problematised the role of  the State through the notion of  
governmentality, but also denaturalised the idea of  civil society, which is, he wrote, made 
“by many fictions” and diverse expertise, “including those of  a poststructural 
persuasion” . We need to abandon the simplistic and homogenous image of  civil society 61
and instead investigate how particular “communities” engage with issues like crime 
 M. Foucault, The birth of  biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–79, trans. G. Burchell, Palgrave Macmillan, 58
Basingstoke 2008, p. 94.
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prevention, urban renewal, health promotion, the integration of  immigrants [and here we 
could easily add the provision of  educational opportunities] .  62
Some of  the articles of  this issue pointedly remind us of  the opportunity to combine 
the final Foucault with other authors/approaches in order to properly tackle the matter 
of  the conditions to be changed for ‘freely’ practicing the self-formation escaping the 
subjectivations of  the educational dispositifs. Peters and Besley – and in a similar vein 
also Borrelli and Bevilacqua – suggest that defending democracy and sustaining parrhesia 
as a critical attitude, that can ultimately secure the connection between democracy and 
true discourse, would require an education that can and should encourage free speech, 
include the analysis of  hate speech and offer the tools to determine what is true or fake 
news in a post-truth world. 
Another direction, apart of  the communitarian one, that is also suggested in two 
articles (Allen and Moreau) resides in a sort of  “rejection“, of  “refusal”2 of  the same 
idea of  an education necessarily entrapped in (neo)liberal logics and their dispositifs. 
Dardot and Laval claim that the practices of  resistance as forms of  counter-conducts are 
unlikely to end up in a political uprising , while as Foucault himself  observes «it is 63
doubtless the strategy codification of  these points of  resistance that makes a revolution 
possible» . Even in the case of  the contributions coming from Simons and Masschelein 64
and Cappa we find a “solution“ that somehow goes beyond Foucault’s work. In 
particular Simons and Masschelein advocate another pedagogy, which paradoxically they 
label as ‘liberal’. Thus, recalling Ranciere’s problematization of  the school ‘form’ as a 
morphology, they claim that a genuine experimental education should be detached by any 
instrumental purpose. In the same vein De Conciliis turns to another critical thinker, 
Sloterdijck, in order to anchor education to a different anthropotechnique, that is the 
foucauldian invitation to consider a parrhesiastic mode of  being an educational subject. 
In the end, we believe that this issue signals and sketches some directions in which to 
look for another political reason, for another governmentality, that would render us less 
governed . On the one hand, it further enriches the tool box to critically contests the 65
modes of  individualization proper to contemporary education, with criticism being here 
a productive act of  imagination that problematises the educational practices we engage 
in, asking if  they «either reinforce or resist the manner in which our freedom— how we 
think, act, and speak—has been governed in ways that are limiting and intolerable» . On 66
the other hand, notwithstanding their shifting focalizations on communitarianism, 
democracy, scepticism, post-education, education as self-formation or parrhesia, all the 
contributions seem to advocate in the direction of  an extension of  our participation to 
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education and the formation of  a collective, a “we” that could also become a potential 
community of  action . They solicit an ethical enthusiasm and agonism  and produce an 67 68
interference, inviting for «practical and agonistic engagement, re-engagement, or 
disengagement with the rationalities and practices»  that led us to become certain kinds 69
of  [educational] subjects in our present. They also highlights how this often requires that 
we go beyond if  not betray Foucault, even the final one, and direct our gaze toward other 
moves that Foucault did not want or was unable to make. 
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